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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
WALLACE MURPHY PLUM,' 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14374 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of 
Wallace Murphy Plum for the crime of receiving ataL&a 
property in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 76-6-408 
(1953) as amended by Laws of Utah 1973. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal respondent seeks to have the 
verdict of guilty affirmed, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 3, 19 75, Sanders Coin Shop at 
432 Twenty-fifth Street in Ogden, Utah, was robbed of 
an assortment of gold and silver coins (R. 6) • 
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Four days later, on July 7, 19 75, defendant 
entered the Rust Coin and Gift Shop at 311 South Main 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, with a satchel of coins 
which defendant indicated he wished to sell (R.65). 
After making an inventory of the coins, Mr* Rust offered 
defendant $2,850.00 for the coins (R. 66-67). The 
defendant said he would check the offer and return, 
which he did about two hours later. Mr. Rust indicated 
he would need time to raise the money agreed upon as 
the sale price, whereupon defendant said he would return 
the next day (T. 6 8). The coins were left with Mr. 
Rust overnight. 
While defendant was still in Rust's coin 
store, an employee of Mr. Rust pointed out to the 
owner a list of coins taken in the Ogden robbery. 
The Rust shop had received a telephone call after 
the robbery informing them of the robbery and describing 
the coins missing (R.68). After defendant had left Mr. 
Rust checked the coins defendant had brought to him. 
Mr. Rust then notified the police (R. 69). 
On July 8, 1975, defendant returned to the 
Rust Coin Shop and was given a check for $2,850.00 by 
Mr. Rust. Defendant was then arrested by Officer Peck 
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for receiving stolen property. Mr* Sanders identified 
some of the coins defendant sold to Mr. Rust as part 
of the coins that had been taken from his shop on 
July 3, 1975 (R. 34). 
Under questioning by Officer Peck, Mr. Plum 
could neither name nor adequately describe the person 
from whom he acquired the coins (R. 92-9 3). Mr. Plum 
could not provide an address for the person who trans-
mitted the coins to him. At one point in the question-
ing the defendant informed Officer Peck that he had 
traded diamonds and jewelry for the coins (R. 93), but 
later defendant stated that he had paid $2,600.00 cash 
on the spot for the coins (R. 94)• Defendant sometimes 
referred to the person from whom he acquired the coins 
as f,hen and other times used the pronoun "they" in 
describing the source of the coins (R. 95). 
After all evidence was presented, the case 
was referred to the jury, and a signed verdict was 
returned finding defendant guilty of receiving stolen 
property, believing the property probably to have 
been stolen. 
( 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1953) AS AMENDED 
BY THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1973, IS SUFFICIENTLY CERTAIN 
TO INFORM PERSONS WHO WOULD BE LAW ABIDING OF THE 
CRITERION THEY MUST MEET IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE 
LAW, THUS NOT RENDERING THE STATUTE VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, as enacted by the 
1973 Utah legislature, makes criminally liable any 
person; who receives, retains or disposes of the 
property of another "Knowing that it has been stolen, 
or believing that it probably has been stolen." The 
quoted language is also employed within the Model 
Penal Code, § 223.6. Appellant argues that the 
quoted part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40 8 states 
two crimes having different elements and requiring 
differing quantums of proof. Appellant further 
argues that the statute fails to inform persons 
who would be 3aw abiding of criterion that must be 
met in order to avoid violating statutory prohibitions. 
In response to the assertion that Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-40 8 contains two crimes with differing quantums 
of proof, respondent would argue that either the receipt 
of stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, or 
receipt of stolen property believing it probably has 
been stolen, must be established beyond a reasonable 
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doubt. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 as amended 
by Laws of Utah, 1973, requires that the same quantum 
of proof be applicable to each and every element of 
any crime charged. 
That statute provides in pertinent part: 
"A defendant in a criminal proceeding 
is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The words 'element of the offense1 are 
defined to mean '(a) the conduct, 
attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibted, or for-
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) the culpable mental state required.•" 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (Supp. 1975). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 sets forth as an 
element of receiving stolen property either that 
defendant knew the property was stolen or believed it 
probably was stolen. Clearly, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-501, quoted above, whichever alterna-
tive the jury finds supportable by the evidence must 
be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Turning to appellant's argument that the 
statute fails to inform law abiding citizens of the 
standard that must be met, it is indeed true that 
guilty knowledge on the part of one receiving property 
is an essential element of most receiving, stolen property 
statutes, 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 88. 
However, it is within the power of the state 
legislature to substitute for guilty knowlege a duty 
to diligently inquire as to the source of goods. 
People v. Rosenthal, 226 U.S. 260, 57 L.Ed. 212, 33 
S.Ct.27 (1912). In Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 the Utah 
legislature has not only made a crime the receipt of 
stolen property with knowledge it was stolen but also 
has required more from the citizens of Utah. The 
legislature has placed criminal sanctions upon an 
individual if the state can produce evidence establish-
ing that he received stolen property "believing it 
probably had been stolen." In effect, this statute 
places a duty of diligent inquiry upon anyone who 
would receive, retain or dispose of the property of 
another. 
Appellant has cited Connally v. General 
Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385 (1925) , in sup-
port of the proposition that Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-408 
is void for vagueness. In Connally, the Court stated 
that prior Supreme Court decisions which had upheld 
statutes as sufficiently certain were often based 
upon the finding that the questioned statutes employed 
words well enough known to enable persons within their 
reach to correctly apply the statute. Or, in some 
- 6 -
cases, it was found that words used within challenged 
statutes actually had a well-settled common law meaning, 
"Notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition 
as to which estimates might differ." 269 U.S. at p. 391. 
In reviewing statutes that had been found by 
the Supreme Court to be unconstitutionally vague, 
Connally repeatedly cited words such as "unjust" or 
"unreasonable." The statute at issue in Connally 
required payment of wages by certain employers to be 
no lower than other wages paid in the locality. The 
Supreme Court found the word "locality" to be imprecise, 
too dependent upon circumstances, and equally satis-
fied by several different measures* 
The word "probably" is not so imprecise 
or dependent upon circumstances as to render it 
void for vagueness. "Probably" has been defined to 
mean "reasonably, credibly, presumably, in all proba-
bility, very likely, so far as evidence shows, likely." 
Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 138 N.W.2d 808, 179 Neb. 496 
(1965). Although there may be an estimate of degree 
on the definition of "probably" as to which persons 
might differ, such a difference in degree cannot be 
said to render a statute employing the word "probably" 
void for vagueness. 
( 
Turning to the use of the word "belief" it has been 
held by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Heygoth v., State, 
275 Wis, 104, 81 N.W.2d 56 (1957), that a belief that 
goods received were stolen is equivalent to knowledge. 
Weaver v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. 309, 235 P.635 (1925), 
cited by appellant, also held that a belief that 
property was stolen, when evidence shows that it was 
in fact stolen, is equivalent to knowledge. . 
Further, it has been consistently held that 
actual knowledge by a defendant that goods are stolen 
need not be established. It is sufficient if the 
defendant had knowledge of facts sufficient to put him 
on notice that the goods were stolen. State v. 
Rockett, 6 Wash. App. 399, 493 P.2d 321 (1972). 
Certain state statutes have substituted for actual 
belief, the existence of reasonable grounds for belief 
that goods were stolen. Farzley v. State, 163 So.39 4, 
231 Ala. 60 (1935); Mott v. State, 24 Ala. App. 580, 
139 So. 118 (1932). The Utah Legislature has in 
effect made such a substitute in the statute at issue 
herein by the use of the phrase "believing the property 
had probably been stolen." 
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The United States Supreme Court recently 
agreed that it is not necessary to show actual knowledge 
that goods received were stolen. In Barnes v. United 
States, 93 S.Ct 2357, 412 U.S. 837, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 
(19 73), the defendant had been convicted of receiving 
stolen United States Treasury checks. In writing 
for the majority Justice Powell found: 
"The evidence established that 
petitioner possessed recently stolen 
Treasury checks payable to persons 
he did not know, and it provided no 
plausible explanation for such 
possession consistent with innocence. 
On the basis of this evidence alone com-
mon sense and experience tell us that pe-
titioner must have known or been aware of 
the high probability that the checks were 
stolen." 93 S.Ct. at p. 2363. 
Again, respondent argues that the Utah legislature 
has codified Barnes and other decisions in imposing 
criminal sanctions upon one who has received stolen 
property "beLieving it probably had been stolen." 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTION NO 10 DEFINING "BELIEVING" AND 
"PROBABLY" AS THOSE TERMS ARE USED IN THE DEFINITION 
OF THE CRIME CHARGED, AND INSTRUCTION NO. 7, DEFINING 
"REASONABLE DOUBT" ARE NOT INCONSISTENT. 
Appellant argues that the Court1s definition 
of reasonable doubt given in Instruction No. 7 (R. 209) 
and the definitions of "believing" and "probably" given 
in Instruction No. 10 (R. 212) cannot be reconciled with 
the verdict returned by the jury. 
More specifically, appellant argues that it is 
not possible to fail to find defendant "knew" property 
was stolen and yet find beyond a reasonable doubt a 
"belief that it had probably been stolen," 
However, it must be pointed out that three 
verdicts were submitted to the jury, a "Not Guilty" 
verdict (R. 229), a "guilty of theft by receiving 
knowing said property had been stolen" verdict (R. 230), 
and, finally, a "guilty of theft by receiving believing 
said property probably had been stolen" verdict (R. 233). 
The third verdict was returned signed (R. 233) . 
Instruction No 8 sets forth the elements of 
the crime charged, and states that the jury must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence 
of each element. Included among the elements in 
Instruction No. 8(4) is the fact that at the time 
the property was received defendant either (a) knew 
it was stolen; or (b) believed that it probably was 
stolen. 
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Thus, Instruction No. 8 properly reflects 
the intent of the legislature that a conviction can 
rest upon an evidentiary showing of actual knowledge, 
or a belief that the property probably had been stolen, 
By signing the third verdict (R.- 233) the jury indicated 
that it unanimously found "beyond a reasonable doubt11, 
each element set forth therein* From all the evidence 
presented the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant believed that the coins probably had 
been stolen. The jury was properly instructed in 
No. 8 that either actual knowledge, or belief that 
the property had probably been stolen, must be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict defendant. 
The jury was not required to find both alternatives, 
and thus the verdict returned is consistent with 
Instructions No. 7 and 10. 
As argued by the Respondent in the discussion 
under Point I, the words "believing11 and "probably" 
have well-defined meanings, and these were set forth 
in Instruction No. 10. The jury instructions properly 
set forth the elements of the crime in Instruction No. 
8, defined two words that constitute one of the elements 
in Instruction No. 10, and finally defined "reasonable 
- 11 -
i 
doubt" in Instruction No. 7. Taken together the jury 
instructions properly advise the jury of each step that 
must be followed to arrive at one of the three V€>rdicts. 
The verdict returned by the jury is consistent with 
the instructions read as a comprehensive group. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD REFLECTS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
 { 
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY AGAINST 
DEFENDANT, 
As has so often been stated, "the test on I 
appeal becomes whether substantial evidence supports 
the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the 
evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." < 
People v. Kunkin, 9 Cal.3d 245, 107 Cal. Rptr, 184, 
507 P.2d 1392, at p. 1395 (1973). The jury in the case 
at issue herein had theopportunity to hear all witnesses \ 
and weigh the credibility of the testimony. If there 
is competent evidence from which reasonable minds 
might draw differing conclusions, the finding of . \ 
the jury will not be disturbed upon appeal. State v. 
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937). 
The evidence establishes that a theft of < 
coins from Sanders Coin Shop in Ogden occurred on 
July 3, 19 75. Just four days later, on July 7, 19 75, an 
individual identified as Wallace Murphy Plum, the ' 
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defendant, entered Rust's Coin and Gift Shop in Salt 
Lake City carrying a satchel of coins. Mr. Plum 
expressed an intent to solicit an offer on the coins. 
After examining the coins Mr. Rust offered the defendant 
$2,850.00 for the entire collection. The offer was 
accepted after defendant conferred with an unidentified 
person. When defendant came to pick up the check the 
next day he was arrested. The coins were identified 
as those taken during the Ogden robbery. 
After his arrest by Officer Peck on July 8, 
19 75, Mr. Plum was asked where he had acquired the 
coins. Mr. Plum responded that a man had come into 
his office with them; however, Mr. Plum could 
neither give the manfs name nor a description (R. 92-
9 3) . At one point in the questioning by Officer Peck 
Mr. Plum stated that he had traded diamonds and 
jewelry for the coins (R. 9 3) but later Mr. Plum 
stated that he had given the unknown man $2600.00 
cash on the spot for the coins (R. 94) • 
When asked how he happened to have that much 
cash, Mr. Plum told Officer Peck that he "does a lot 
of turquoise," according to Officer Peckfs testimony. 
Under questioning Mr. Plum usually referred to the 
seller as "he" but occasionally used the pronoun 
"them." (R. 94). However, at no time could Mr. Plum 
identify from whom he received the coins, a description 
- "I ** — " 
of the person or an address (R. 9 5) . No paperwork and 
no receipt accompanied the transaction between Mr. Plum and 
the person or persons from whom the coins were acquired 
(R. 92). 
It has consistently been held that evidence of 
unexplained possession of recently stolen goods by an 
individual charged with unlawfully receiving them is 
admissible, and is a strong circumstance a jury can 
consider with all other evidence on the question of 
guilty knowledge. State v. Tollett, 71 Wash.2d 806, 
431 P.2d 168 (1967). All circumstances surrounding 
acquisition of recently stolen property and a defendant's 
contradictory statements have been held to give rise 
to the justifiable inference that the defendant knew 
property was stolen. United States v. May, 430 F.2d 
715 (1970). In Barnes, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court found that possession of recently stolen 
property, if not satisfactorily explained, is a cir-
cumstance from which the jury may properly draw an 
inference and find that the person in possession 
knew the property had been stolen. 
All the circumstances surrounding the 
acquisition of the coins by Mr. Plum, including his 
inability to name, describe or give an address for the 
- 14 -
for the seller, his contradictory statements regarding 
payment for the coins, the lack of any paperwork or a 
receipt, the cash transaction, and the possession by Mr. 
Plum of property stolen four days prior, are suffi-
cient to support the verdict. 
It was within the province of the jury to 
weigh the testimony of Mr. Pantelakis (R. 150 et. seq.) 
and Mr. Van Komen (R. 138 et. seq.) in determining 
defendant's state of mind upon receiving the stolen 
coins. Roberts, supra. Respondent would argue that 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received 
the coins stolen from the Sanders Coin Shop in Ogden 
believing that the coins probably had been stolen, as 
prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953) as 
amended by the Laws of Utah 1973. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, it is respectfully urged that 
the jury verdict of guilty be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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